The number of tasks which are performed on wireless devices instead of stationary computers is steadily increasing. Due to limited resources on these mobile devices computation offloading became a relevant concept. We investigate a nonconvex generalized Nash game for a group of mobile users in which each user tries to minimize his own task completion time. For this the users can offload parts of their computation task to a connected cloudlet with limited computation power. Here, the time restriction resulting from offloading is formulated as a vanishing constraint. We show that a unique Nash equilibrium exists and that the price of anarchy is one, i.e. the equilibrium coincides with a centralized solution. Further we consider the possibility for some users to have a temporal advantage, which leads to an MPEC/EPEC structure.
This work is supported by the 'Excellence Initiative' of the German Federal and State Governments and the Graduate School of Computational Engineering at Technische Universität Darmstadt.